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Abstract
Single minded agents have strict preferences, in which a bundle is acceptable only if it meets a certain
demand. Such preferences arise naturally in scenarios such as allocating computational resources among
users, where the goal is to fairly serve as many requests as possible. In this paper we study the fair
division problem for such agents, which is harder to handle due to discontinuity and complementarities
of the preferences.
Our solution concept—the competitive allocation from equal incomes (CAEI)—is inspired from mar-
ket equilibria and implements fair outcomes through a pricing mechanism. We study the existence and
computation of CAEI for multiple divisible goods, cake cutting, and multiple discrete goods. For the
first two scenarios we show that existence of CAEI solutions is guaranteed, while for the third we give a
succinct characterization of instances that admit this solution; then we give an efficient algorithm to find
one in all three cases. Maximizing social welfare turns out to be NP-hard in general, however we obtain
efficient algorithms for (i) divisible and discrete goods when the number of different types of players is
a constant, (ii) cake cutting with contiguous demands, for which we establish an interesting connection
with interval scheduling, and (iii) cake cutting with a constant number of players with arbitrary demands.
Our solution is useful more generally, when the players have a target set of desired goods, and very
small positive values for any bundle not containing their target set.
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1 Introduction
The question of dividing scarce resources among multiple participants in a way that is fair has remained a
pressing question that intrigued humans for a long time, be it for dividing land among citizens1 or allocating
organizational resources to its members. The formal study of fair division as we know it started during
World War II with works of Steinhaus, Knaster and Banach [41]. Much of the earlier work focused on
one heterogeneous divisible good, i.e. the cake cutting problem [7, 35], while other models (such as the
problem of allocating multiple divisible or discrete goods) and notions of fairness were studied later in
a growing body of literature, which includes multiple academic books [7, 35, 30]. Fair division has been
recently studied in the computer science community, as problems in resource allocation and fair division
in particular are arguably relevant in scenarios such as manufacturing and scheduling, airport traffic, and
industrial procurement [14, 33].
Prominent examples of fair division models that surfaced recently in real scenarios include problem of
allocating computational resources (e.g. CPU, memory, bandwith) among the users of a system [22], or the
problem of allocating university courses to students in a way that is fair and efficient. The latter motivated
the introduction of a notion of fairness known as A-CEEI [11], which approximates the well known ideal
notion of fairness from economics, the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes [21, 42]. Othman et al.
[[32]] studied the complexity of A-CEEI with pessimistic conclusions for general preferences. Nevertheless,
the A-CEEI solution is used to allocate courses to students at the Wharton Business School at the University
of Pennsylvania.
The largest body of the literature on fair division models for multiple divisible and indivisible goods,
as well as cake cutting, focuses on additive valuations, which capture perfect substitutes, i.e. goods that can
replace each other in consumption, such as Pepsi and Coca-Cola. However, many real allocation problems
have complementarities in the preferences to various degrees. For example, if the user of a computer system
wants to run a specific task, they may need 2 units of CPU and 5 units of RAM. It is not useful if the user
gets only 1 unit of CPU but 6 or more units of RAM – they simply cannot run the task because CPU is a
bottleneck resource in this case.
An important scenario with complements is that of single minded valuations, where the agent values
a particular bundle and nothing less, and anything extra does not add to the value. Such valuations arise
naturally, for example assembling a bike requires a set of parts, or an agent’s computational task can finish
if and only if it is allocated a required bundle of resource. The latter example represents basis for more
complex models that take into account the dynamics over time. Due to their immense applicability, there is
an extensive body of literature on such single minded valuations in areas such as auctions (see, e.g., [10, 31,
27, 36]), however work on fair division with such valuations is largely missing.
1.1 Our Contribution
We study fair division among single minded agents for three main scenarios, namely multiple divisible
goods, cake cutting, and discrete goods. Our main solution concept—the “competitive allocation from equal
incomes” (CAEI)—is inspired from market equilibria and implements fair outcomes through a pricing mech-
anism. The CAEI solution can be seen as a relaxation of the standard competitive equilibrium from equal
incomes and is a more intuitive notion for discrete resources than the latter. However many of our results,
most notably for multiple divisible goods, carry over to the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes so-
lution. The CAEI solution concept is sandwiched between the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes
1Divide-and-choose is mentioned already in the Bible, in the Book of Genesis (chapter 13)
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and envy-freeness, and it prunes (via the prices), the least desirable envy-free allocations. Nevertheless,
CAEI exists if and only if envy-free allocations exist in all the fair division models we consider.
For multiple divisible goods and cake cutting we show existence of CAEI, while for discrete goods we
give a succinct characterization of instances that admit this solution; then we give an efficient algorithm
to find one in all cases. Maximizing social welfare turns out to be NP-hard in general, however we obtain
efficient algorithms for a number of settings, (i) divisible and discrete goods when the number of different
types of agents is a constant, (ii) cake cutting with contiguous demands, for which we establish an interesting
connection with interval scheduling, and (iii) cake cutting with constant number of agents.
Our results also carry over to valuation models where the agents have a desired target set (e.g. the set of
parts of a bike), while having very small positive value () for any bundle that does not contain their desired
set. For such scenarios (which are compatible with experimental evidence that people like to accumulate
“stuff”, even if unneeded), the solution computed is an -CAEI.
2 Background
We begin by presenting the model and solution concept for the most general setting. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be
a set of agents and R a set of resources, where R is a compact subset of a Euclidean space. Each agent i is
equipped with a valuation function Vi over the resources, such that for each subset S ⊆ R, Vi(S) represents
the valuation of agent i for bundle S. The goal is to allocate the resources among the agents in a way that is
fair.
Agent i is said to be single minded if there exists a bundle Di ⊆ R that i cannot be happy without; that
is, for any other bundle S ⊆ R we have that Vi(S) = 1 if Di ⊂ S and Vi(S) = 0 otherwise.
An allocation x = (x1, . . . ,xn) is a partition of the set R of resources such that xi ⊆ R is the bundle
received by agent i, the bundles are not intersecting and add up to the whole space.
Our solution concept—the “competitive allocation from equal incomes” (CAEI)—is inspired from mar-
ket equilibria and implements fair outcomes through a pricing mechanism. More formally, each agent is
given an artificial unit of currency by the center. It can be used to acquire goods, and has no intrinsic value.
The agent wants to spend its budget to acquire a bundle of items that maximizes its utility. A CAEI outcome
is defined as a tuple 〈p,x〉, where x is an allocation and p : R → R+ is an integrable, non-negative price
density function, such that for each subset S ⊆ R,
p(S) =
∫
x∈S
p(x)dx.
Formally, a tuple 〈p,x〉 is a CAEI solution if and only if:
• For all i ∈ N , xi maximizes agent i’s utility given prices p and its unit budget.
• All the resources are allocated:⋃ni=1 xi = R.
• No agent overspends: p(xi) ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N .
The difference between the CAEI solution and the classical notion of a competitive equilibrium from
equal incomes (CEEI), is that under CEEI, the agents are additionally required to spend all of their budget.
Since we are in a fair division setting, neither the center nor the agents have value for the units of currency,
thus the requirement of spending all the budgets can be relaxed naturally. Moreover, in several of the sce-
narios we study, the CEEI solution is not as tractable due to discontinuity of the valuations and/or discrete
3
goods. Crucially, every CAEI allocation is envy-free, since if an agent envied another agent’s bundle it could
just buy it instead, as the endowments are equal; the prices provide a mechanism for indicating the interest
level in the different resources. However, since the valuations are discontinuous, CAEI outcomes are not
necessarily efficient, and so our aim will be to compute CAEI allocations with improved welfare guarantees.
The social welfare of an allocation x is the sum of utilities of all the agents: SW (x) =
∑n
i=1 Vi(xi).
3 Multiple Divisible Goods
We now formalize the model with multiple divisible goods and single minded agents. There is a set N =
{1, . . . , n} of agents and a set M = {1, . . . ,m} of goods. Without loss of generality, each good comes in
one unit that is infinitely divisible. Each agent i demands a bundle Di = 〈vi,1, . . . , vi,m〉, where vi,j ∈ [0, 1]
denotes the fraction required by agent i from good j. The utility of agent i for a bundle z ∈ [0, 1]m is
Vi(z) = 1 if zj ≥ vi,j for all j ∈M , and Vi(z) = 0 otherwise. Since every part of a good is equally valued
by agents, it suffices to specify its per unit price, i.e., pj ∈ R+ for good j.
We first show that the CAEI solution is guaranteed to exist for multiple divisible goods with single
minded valuations, and can moreover be computed in polynomial time. In order to prove this, we must
introduce the Fisher market model, which is a classical model of an economy developed by Fisher [5].
A Fisher marketM consists of a set N = {1, . . . , n} of buyers (agents) and a set M = {1, . . . ,m} of
divisible goods (items). Every buyer i has:
• an initial budget Bi > 0, which can be viewed as some currency that can be used to acquire goods but
has no intrinsic value to the buyer, and
• a utility function ui : [0, 1]m → R that maps a quantity vector of the m items to a real value. ui(xi)
represents the buyer’s utility when receiving xi amount of the items.
Without loss of generality, the supply of each good is assumed to be one unit. A standard type of valua-
tions is known as Leontief, where the utility of a buyer i for a bundle xi is: ui(xi) = minj∈[m]
{
xij
vij
}
, where
vi,j is the coefficient that describes buyer i’s valuation for good j. Thus buyers with Leontief utilities desire
the goods in the same ratios (e.g. in the case of two goods—CPU and RAM—a buyer with coefficients 5
and 1, respectively, will require 5 more units of CPU for every additional unit of RAM).
Each buyer in the market wants to spend its entire budget to acquire a bundle of items that maximizes
its utility. A market outcome is defined as a tuple 〈p,x〉, where p is a vector of prices for the m items and
x = (x1, . . . ,xn) is an allocation of the m items, with pj denoting the price of item j and xij representing
the amount of item j received by buyer i. A market outcome that maximizes the utility of each buyer subject
to its budget constraint and clears the market is called a market equilibrium [31]. Formally, 〈p,x〉 is a market
equilibrium if and only if:
1. Optimal bundle: ∀i ∈ N and ∀y : y · p ≤ Bi, ui(xi) ≥ ui(y)
2. Market clearing: Each good is fully sold or has price zero, i.e., ∀j ∈M ,∑mj=1 xi,j ≤ 1, and equality
holds if pj > 0. Each buyer exhausts all its budget, i.e., ∀i ∈ N,
∑m
j=1 xi,jpj = Bi.
A market equilibrium is guaranteed to exist for very general valuations [28]. For Leontief utilities, it can
be computed using the Eisenberg-Gale (EG) convex program formulations that follows.
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max
∑n
i=1Bi · log ui
s.t. ui ≤ xi,jvi,j , ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M∑n
i=1 xi,j ≤ 1, ∀ j ∈M
xi,j ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N, j ∈M
(1)
We can now show the existence and computation of the CAEI solution for single minded agents.
Theorem 1 Given a fair division problem with multiple divisible goods and single minded agents, a CAEI
solution is guaranteed to exist and can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof: Given a fair division problem (N,M,D), we consider a Fisher market where the set of buyers is
N and the set of items is M . Each buyer i has budget Bi = 1 and Leontief utility described by the vector
Di = 〈vi,1, . . . , vi,m〉, i.e. for any bundle z, we have
ui(z) = min
j∈M :vi,j>0
{
zj
vi,j
}
.
Recall that Fisher markets with Leontief utilities always have exact market equilibria.
Let (x,p) be any such equilibrium, where xi,j is the fraction received by agent i from good j and pj is the
price of good j. Denote the Leontief utility of buyer i in the market by uLi (xi,p) = minj∈M :vi,j>0
{
xi,j
vi,j
}
.
We argue the market equilibrium (x,p) is a CAEI solution for the fair division problem with single minded
agents. To this end, we must show that all the items are allocated, each agent spends no more than a unit, and
gets in exchange an optimal bundle at those prices. Clearly the first two requirements are met since (x,p) is
a market equilibrium in the Fisher market with identical budgets.
We additionally show that each agent gets an optimal bundle in the fair division problem. For every
agent i, if the allocation x satisfies the property that xi,j ≥ vi,j for all j ∈M , then Vi(xi) = 1 and i gets its
demand at these prices. Otherwise, there is an item k with vi,k > 0 but xi,k < vi,k; then agent i does not get
its demand, thus Vi(xi) = 0. Since (x,p) is a market equilibrium with respect to the Leontief utilities given
by v, we have that
uLi (xi,p) ≤
xi,k
vi,k
< 1.
Assume by contradiction that in the fair division problem agent i could afford its demand set at prices p,
i.e. ∃y ∈ [0, 1]m with yj ≥ vi,j ∀j ∈ M , and p(y) ≤ 1. Then in the Fisher market with Leontief utilities,
buyer i could also purchase bundle y and get:
uLi (y,p) = min
j:vi,j>0
{
yj
vi,j
}
≥ min
j:vi,j>0
{
vi,j
vi,j
}
= 1 > uLi (xi,p),
which is a strict improvement over xi, contradicting that (x,p) is a market equilibrium in the Fisher market.
Thus the assumption was false and (x,p) is a CAEI.
Finally, a Fisher market equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time via a convex program formu-
lation (Equation 1; see Codenotti and Varadarajan [15] for more details). As argued above, this algorithm
can be used to compute a CAEI solution for single minded agents. 
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As the next example illustrates, the solution computed in Theorem 1 is not necessarily optimal.
Example 1 Consider 2 agents and 2 goods, where the demand of agent 1 is D1 = 〈0.5, 0.4〉 and of agent
2 is D2 = 〈0, 0.6〉. The CAEI solution from Theorem 1 prices good 1 at p1 = 0 and good 2 at p2 = 2, and
the allocation splits good 2 equally between the two agents. This way agent 2 gets zero utility, while agent 1
gets utility 1 (and some extra good that is of no use).
Instead, another possible CAEI solution is to set prices p′ = 〈1/3, 5/3〉, where agent 2 can now afford
a quantity of 0.6 from good 2, and agent 1 still gets its demand. Thus the CAEI solution computed via
the Leontief market equilibrium is dominated by another CAEI solution with better welfare, which is not a
solution to the program for Leontief market equilibrium.
We show that while maximizing social welfare is in general NP-hard, the problem can be solved in poly-
nomial time when the number of types of agents is constant. This allows handling possibly large numbers of
agents when their demands fit some standard templates for resource requests.
Theorem 2 Computing a CEEI solution that maximizes social welfare for single minded valuations with
divisible goods is NP-hard.
Proof: We use a reduction from the NP-complete problem SET PACKING:
Given a collection C = 〈C1, . . . , Cn〉 of finite sets and a positive integerK ≤ n, does C contain
at least K mutually disjoint sets?
Given collection C and integer K, let M be a fair division problem with agents N = {1, . . . , n}, items
M = {1, . . . ,m + n}, and demand sets such that each agent i ∈ N wants 100% of each item in the set
Ci∪{m+ i}. In other words, the fair division problem on such instances can be seen as equivalent to that of
allocating multiple indivisible goods (where Qj = 1 for each good j and agent i can get either 0% or 100%
of each good.
It can be checked that M has a CAEI solution with social welfare at least K if and only if C has a
disjoint collection of at least K sets. 
Theorem 3 Given a fair division problem with single minded agents and divisible goods, a welfare maxi-
mizing CAEI solution can be found in polynomial time for a constant number of agent types.
Proof: We are given a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents, M of items, valuations D, and T a set of types of
agents, such that for each i ∈ N , τ(i) ∈ T represents the type of agent i, and agents with same type have
identical valuation (τ(i) = τ(i′)⇒ vi = vi′). Algorithm 1 solves this problem and runs in polynomial time
for fixed |T |.
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Algorithm 1: COMPUTE-MAX-CAEI
Data: Agents N = {1, . . . , n}, items M = {1, . . . , m}, valuations v, types τ
Result: Social welfare maximizing CAEI
1 (OPT,x∗,p∗)← (−∞,NULL,NULL)
2 foreach S ⊆ T do
3 (m,p)← SOLVE-OPTIMAL-SUBSET(S,M)
4 xi,j =
mi,j
pj
, ∀i ∈ N, ∀j ∈M
5 if (SW(x) > OPT) then
6 OPT ← SW(x)
7 (x∗,p∗)← (x,p)
8 end
9 end
10 Return (x∗,p∗)
maximize 
subject to
m∑
j=1
pj · vi,j ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N : τ(i) ∈ S
m∑
j=1
pj · vi,j ≥ 1 + , ∀i ∈ N : τ(i) ∈ S¯
mi,j ≥ pj · vi,j , ∀j ∈M,∀i : τ(i) ∈ S
m∑
i=1
mi,j = pj , ∀j ∈M
m∑
j=1
mi,j ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N
p ≥ 0; m ≥ 0;  ≥ 0
Procedure SOLVE-OPTIMAL-SUBSET is given as a linear program, where pj is the price of good j, mi,j
is the amount of money spent by agent i on good j, and  is a variable that should be strictly positive in the
optimal solution if the set S of agent types can be made simultaneously happy.
The observation underlying the algorithm is that agents of the same type must have identical utilities (but
not necessarily identical bundles). The COMPUTE-MAX-CAEI procedure tries to compute a CAEI solution
for every set S of types so that agents of type τ ∈ S are satisfied, while agents outside S cannot afford
their demand. The LP constraints ensure these conditions are met and a positive solution is found if and
only if there exists a CAEI solution for the set S. At the end, the COMPUTE-MAX-CAEI algorithm takes the
maximum over all S. 
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Figure 1: Three agents with single minded valuations; the intervals required by each agent are shown through
shaded areas of different filling.
4 Cake Cutting
Next we investigate the cake cutting problem with single minded agents. Cake cutting models the problem
of allocating a heterogeneous divisible resource, such as land, time, mineral deposits or computer memory,
among agents with different preferences. The “cake” is represented mathematically as the interval [0, 1]
and the agents have different preferences over the interval. A “piece” of cake A is a union of intervals:
A = (I1, . . . , Im).
The literature on cake cutting has seen very interesting algorithmic developments in recent years (see,
e.g., [26, 39, 3]), all of which are concerned with additive valuations in the one-dimensional model. Among
the few exceptions we mention: [12] studied fair division with additive valuations constrained by a minimum
length requirement (PUML), [9] studied externalities in cake cutting, while [37, 38], studied cake cutting
in two dimensions, where the agents also care about the shape of the pieces that they receive. In earlier
work, a different multidimensional model of fair division has been explored under the name of pie-cutting
by Brams et al. [6], while a very general model of fair resource division has been explored in the works
of DallAglio and Maccheroni [17] and of Husseinov and Sagara [24], who prove the existence of fair and
efficient allocations under mild conditions assuming that the valuations are continuous. However, single
minded valuations are discontinuous, and so their results do not directly imply ours.
In this paper we focus on single minded agents, and so each agent i will demand a set Di consisting
of possibly several disjoint intervals: Di = (Di,1, . . . , Di,mi). The utility of agent i for a piece of cake
A ⊆ [0, 1] is: Vi(A) = 1 if Di ⊆ A and Vi(A) = 0 otherwise.
Examples of single minded agents in cake cutting include cases where the agent requires land that has
buildings on it (with some particular functionality) or wants to build a house in a particular location. The
case where each single minded agent requires a contiguous piece (i.e., mi = 1) can in fact be mapped to a
standard problem known as “interval scheduling” in operations research. An instance of 3 agents with single
minded valuations in cake cutting is illustrated in Figure 2.
We show that a CAEI solution always exists and can be computed efficiently in this model.
Theorem 4 A CAEI solution is guaranteed to exist and can be computed in polynomial time in the cake
cutting problem with single minded agents.
Proof: For each i ∈ N , let Di = (Di,1, . . . , Di,mi) be the disjoint intervals in its demand set, where
Di,j = [li,j , ri,j ] ⊆ [0, 1]. Divide each intervalDi,j into two equal pieces, and let Fi,j =
{
li,j ,
li,j+ri,j
2 , ri,j
}
be the set of points resulting from this partition of Di,j . Consider the set of all the distinct points thus
obtained: P = (⋃ni=1 ⋃mij=1 Fi,j) ∪ {0, 1} = {q0, q1, . . ., qm}, where 0 = q0 < q1 < . . . < qm = 1. Then
we can view every segment Ik = [qk, qk+1] delimitated by two consecutive points in P as an indivisible
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good; moreover, good Ik is in the demand set of each agent i for which [qk, qk+1] ⊂ Di. This gives a related
allocation problem with m indivisible goods and n agents, where no agent has a demand set consisting of a
single good. The latter property follows from the fact that we partitioned each interval Di,j into two pieces,
which are viewed as distinct goods. From [8], a competitive equilibrium from equal incomes is guaranteed
to exist and can be computed in polynomial time for every fair division problem with indivisible goods and
single minded agents, where no agent has a demand set with only one good; let (x,p) be such an allocation
and prices.
Then we can compute a CAEI solution in cake cutting by allocating the intervals in P in the same order
(from left to right) as the indivisible goods are allocated under x and setting the price curve of each interval
[qk, qk+1] uniformly such that it sums up to the price of the corresponding indivisible good. 
When the demands of the agents are contiguous, a welfare maximizing CAEI solution can be computed
in polynomial time; the proof exploits a connection with the interval scheduling problem.
Theorem 5 A welfare-maximizing CAEI can be computed in polynomial time in cake cutting with single
minded agents and contiguous demands. Moreover, when there are no identical agents, the welfare maxi-
mizing CAEI coincides with the solution to the pure optimization problem of maximizing welfare.
Proof: The idea is to leverage a connection with the interval scheduling problem [25] to first decide the
agents that get allocated, and then to construct an asymmetric pricing scheme to implement a price equilib-
rium.
The interval scheduling problem is as follows. There are n jobs to be run on a supercomputer, where
each job i runs from time si to time fi. There are multiple such requests arriving simultaneously, and the
goal is to process as many of them as possible, but the computer can only run one job at a time. The question
is how to schedule the jobs so that the maximum number of requests is served. The optimal allocation—that
maximizes the number of jobs scheduled—is given by a greedy algorithm: Schedule first the job with the
earliest finishing time, then remove the jobs intersecting with it, and repeat among the remaining jobs.
This problem can be mapped to cake cutting with single minded agents by considering an agent for
each job, i.e. N = {1, . . . , n}, and setting the demand of each agent i to the schedule of job i, that is
Di = {[si, fi]}, where si, fi are normalized in [0, 1].
While our aim is to indeed maximize the number of completed jobs, we want to achieve this in a way
that is fair. That is, we will compute an allocation of the cake x and a price curve p such that (x,p) represent
a CAEI solution, where p(x) is the value of the price density function at point x. This can be accomplished
by allocating the agents in the same name order that the greedy algorithm allocates the corresponding jobs,
with the caveat that if multiple agents have the same finishing time, then the one with the latest starting time
must be selected. The agents that intersect with the last scheduled agent will not get their demand set.
For each k-th agent that gets selected to receive their full demand, we select two very small intervals at
the left and right endpoints of their demanded interval, respectively, and price them (uniformly) to sum up
to k ·  and 1 − k · , respectively. When there are no identical demands, the agents that don’t get served
but for which there is an unallocated piece of their demand, can receive a small such piece (at a total price
of 1); otherwise, they get nothing (but their demand now has the property that it costs more than 1). This
allocation can be done so that the whole cake is divided.
Then to handle identical agents, the algorithm can be modified such that whenever selecting the earliest
finishing time and finding multiple agents with the same finish and start time, then take a very small interval
at the leftmost point of the unallocated cake and divide it equally among the identified identical agents,
setting the price uniformly to sum up to their budgets. Then iterate on the remaining cake. 
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Figure 2: Four agents with contiguous single minded demands, indicated by the blue brackets on the intervals
(left). On the right, the two agents selected in the optimal schedule are circled and the prices marked on top of
each differently priced interval (the price listed indicates the price of the whole interval for the corresponding
green bracket).
An example with four agents is given in Figure 2; note that in this picture, for simplicity of presentation,
the kth scheduled agent has the areas costing k and 1 − k distributed over its entire demand—this is
allowed by the algorithm. However, generally one can select two arbitrarily small intervals (prefix and suffix
of agent k’s demand) and only price these.
On the other hand, if the demands are not contiguous, then the problem of computing a welfare maxi-
mizing CAEI is NP-hard.
Theorem 6 Given a cake cutting problem with single minded valuations, computing a welfare-maximizing
CAEI is NP-hard.
Proof: We analyze the decision version of the welfare maximization problem and reduce from the NP-
complete problem SET PACKING: Given universe U = {1, . . . ,m}, collection C = 〈C1, . . . , Cn〉 of finite
subsets of U , and a positive integer K ≤ n, does C contain at least K mutually disjoint sets?
Given such an instance, consider a cake cutting problem with single minded valuations where the set of
agents is N = {1, . . . , n} and the cake is divided into m+n intervals, such that interval Ij =
[
j
m+n ,
j+1
m+n
]
and the demand set of each agent i is Di =
(⋃
j∈Ci Ij
)
∪ Im+i. The idea is that the intervals I1, . . . , Im
correspond to the elements of the universe U and the demand of agent i corresponds to the elements of Ci
plus one more interval (Im+i) specifically designed for agent i.
If the cake cutting problem has an optimal allocation from equal incomes with social welfare of at least
K, then clearly it is possible for K agents to simultaneously receive their demand sets, and so the SET
PACKING problem has a solution of value at least K. On the other hand, if the SET PACKING problem has
a solution of value at least K, let S = 〈Ci1 , . . . , CiK 〉 be the respective sets in the solution. Then consider
the following allocation and price of the cake. For each agent i for which Ci ⊂ S, price all the intervals Ij
where j ∈ Ci uniformly and at a total value of 1; moreover, set the price of interval Im+i at zero. For each
agent i for which Ci 6⊆ S , price the interval Im+i uniformly at total value 1 and give it to agent i. Price
all the remaining cake (that has not been allocated by this point) at zero and allocate it arbitrarily. It can be
checked that the constructed allocation and prices represent an optimal allocation from equal incomes. Thus
the SET PACKING problem has a solution of value at least K if and only if the cake cutting problem has an
optimal allocation from equal incomes with social welfare at least K, which completes the reduction. 
We can also maximize social welfare for discontinuous demands in polynomial time when the number
of agents is constant. The idea is to try out every possible set S ⊆ N of happy agents, who will receive their
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required land at a price of one, while the remaining agents split the remaining cake at prices so they cannot
afford their demand. Then select the outcome that maximizes welfare among all choices of S. We note
that the procedure of computing a partition induced by the desired intervals was also employed by Cohler
et al. [16] in the context of computing welfare maximizing envy-free allocations for additive piecewise
constant valuations.
Theorem 7 Given a cake cutting problem with single minded agents, a welfare maximizing CAEI can be
computed in polynomial time when the number of agents is constant.
Proof: We first show that given a fixed set of agents S ⊆ N , it can be checked in polynomial time if
there exists a CAEI solution that makes all the agents in S happy, and all the agents in N \ S unhappy.
Consider the partition P induced by the endpoints of the consecutive intervals desired by all the agents; let
P = (I1, . . . , Im). Divide each interval Ij into a number of pieces (of the same length) equal to the number
of agents that want this piece. This gives a refinement P ′ = (J1, . . . , Jr) of the partition P . Then we can
view each interval J` as a divisible good and run the linear program used as a subroutine in Algorithm 1 on
these goods with the set of agents N , where the demand of i for good Jr is set to vi,r = 1 if Jr ⊆ Di and
vi,r = 0, otherwise. Then we obtain a feasible solution if and only if the cake cutting problem has a CAEI
allocation where the set S is happy. Note that the increase in the number of goods is polynomial in n and
the sizes of the original desired intervals, Di.
By iterating over every possible set S of agents, we can select the one that maximizes social welfare in
polynomial time when the number of agents is constant. 
Finally, we illustrate the fact that in the cake cutting domain with single minded valuations, the CEEI
solution—which requires that each agent completely exhausts its fictitious budget—becomes very different
from the CAEI notion; in fact it achieves worse social welfare. Consider the following problem.
Example 2 Let there be a cake cutting instance with agents N = {1, 2, 3} and valuations such that the
desired intervals are D1 = [0, 0.5], D2 = [0.5, 1], and D3 = [0, 1]. Then a CAEI solution is to set the price
uniformly, such that p(x) = 2 for all x ∈ [0, 1], and the allocation to x1 = [0, 0.5], x2 = [0.5, 1], and
x3 = ∅. Then agents 1 and 2 get precisely their demand, at a price of 1, while agent 3 gets the empty set;
however this is feasible since agent 3 cannot do better—the price of its demand, D3, exceeds the agent’s
budget: p(D3) = 2 > 1. Moreover, this coincides with the optimal schedule from the interval scheduling
problem, where the start and end times are s1 = 0, f1 = 0.5, s2 = 0.5, f2 = 1, and s3 = 0, f3 = 1.
Clearly, this is not a CEEI solution because agent 3 does not exhaust its budget. Instead, a CEEI solution
would be to set p(x) = 2, ∀x ∈ [0, 0.5], p(x) = 4, ∀x ∈ [0.5, 1], and the allocation to x1 = [0, 0.5],
x2 = [0.5, 0.75], and x3 = [0.75, 1]. This outcome is worse than the optimal schedule, supported at the
welfare maximizing CAEI solution computed above.
5 Multiple Discrete Goods
Our setting for discrete goods is as follows. There is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents and M = {1, . . . , n}
of items, where each item j comes in Qj indivisible copies. Each agent i has a demand set Di ⊆ M , and
wants a copy of each item j ∈ Di; Di is not a multi-set. Without loss of generality, we assume that each
type of item is required by some agent. We illustrate the model with an example.
Example 3 There are agents N = {1, 2}, items M = {1, 2, 3}, quantities Q1 = Q3 = 1, Q2 = 2, and
demands D1 = {1, 2}, D2 = {2, 3}.
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The goal is to find a set of prices for each item—such that every copy from the same item has an identical
price—together with an allocation x such that (x,p) is a CAEI solution. In our example, a CAEI solution
is attained at: p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.5, p3 = 0.5 and x1 = {1, 2}, x2 = {2, 3}.
Note that similarly to the cake cutting problem, the CAEI solution is very different from CEEI. In
particular, there are instances—such as the one illustrated in the next example—where although there are
enough items to go around to all the agents, the number of units is “wrong”, and so the prices can never be
set so that all the budgets are exhausted. This provides additional motivation for studying the CAEI notion
of fairness when allocating discrete goods.
Example 4 Consider an instance with agents N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, itms M = {1, 2}, quantities Q1 = Q2 = 3,
demand sets D1 = {2}, D2 = {1, 2}, D3 = {1, 2}, D4 = {1}. Then the prices p1 = p2 = 0.5 and
allocation x1 = {2}, x2 = x3 = {1, 2}, x4 = {1} represents a CAEI solution.
However, there is no CEEI solution, since it’s never possible to allocate the entire set of items in a way
that exhausts all the budgets.
Next we provide a succinct characterization of the instances that admit a CAEI solution. To this end, a
useful notion will be that of over-demand. We say that an item j is over-demanded among a set of agents S if
the aggregate demand of the agents in S exceeds the available supply from item j, namely Qj . We illustrate
this phenomenon in the next example.
Example 5 Consider a market M with single minded agents and discrete goods, where M = {1, 2},
with quantities Q1 = 2 and Q2 = 4, and agents N = {1, . . . , 4}, with demands: D1 = D2 = D3 = {1},
D4 = {1, 2}. Then the aggregate demand of the set of agents S = {1, 2, 3} with singleton demands, consists
of 3 copies of item 1, which exceeds Q1, the available supply from this item. Thus item 1 is over-demanded
among S.
The next theorem shows that these are essentially the only instances that don’t have a fair outcome. We
say that demand of agent i is singleton if |Di| = 1.
Theorem 8 Given a fair division problem with single minded agents and discrete goods, a CAEI solution
exists if and only if there is no set of agents with singleton demands that give rise to an over-demanded item
among that set. Moreover, a solution can be computed in polynomial time if it exists.
Proof: Consider Algorithm 2. Clearly, if there is a set of agents S with singleton demands, such that
Di = {j} for some j ∈ M and all i ∈ S, where |S| > Qj , then no CAEI can exist. This is because pj ≤ 1
causes over-demand, and pj > 1 makes it un-affordable and thereby un-sold.
We claim all other instances admit a CAEI. Algorithm 2 forms a sequence S of active agents, initially
containing all the agents sorted in increasing order of |Di|, and then iterates over the item types, at each step
searching for an item that is desired by more agents among the active ones (i.e. in S) than there are copies
available. If such an item j is found, then j is allocated at a price of pj = 1, one copy to each of the first Qj
agents in S that want it. All the active agents that got item j are removed from S, and the algorithm searches
for another such over-demanded and unallocated item among the updated set S. Otherwise, when no such
item is found, all the goods left are in abundant supply for the agents in S and can be given for a small price
() among them. Note that these last agents, which are allocated bundles at a price of  per good, receive not
only items that they desire, but in fact all the remaining items.
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Figure 3: Multiple discrete goods and single minded valuations: Polynomial-time algorithm yielding a suc-
cinct characterization of instances that admit a CAEI solution
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We argue that the pricing rule ensures that a CAEI is computed. In particular, all the goods are allocated—
at latest, the player (or set of players), which receive items in the last round of the algorithm, get all the
remaining items. Moreover, the pricing rule is such that each agent i is allocated all of its bundle at once,
regardless of whether xi contains i’s required demand set or not. The agents are divided in two categories,
namely those who get exactly one item at a price of 1 (Line 9) and those who get multiple items at a price
of  (Line 13). In both cases, the pricing rule ensures that the allocation xi costs at most 1.
Finally, we argue that each agent gets an optimal bundle at the given prices. Let i be an agent that has
not received its demand under the allocation x (Di 6⊆ xi). The algorithm gives all the agents with singleton
demands their required items, so we have |Di| > 1. We show that agent i cannot afford the set Di:
Case 1). Agent i receives one item priced at 1. Since all the items have positive prices and |Di| > 1, we
have p(Di) > 1, so i cannot afford its demand.
Case 2). Agent i gets an empty bundle. Then agent i never got allocated in the ALLOCATE-REMAINDER
subroutine, which corresponds to the phase where the remaining items are plentiful for the cur-
rently unallocated agents. Thus agent i wanted at least one item j allocated in one of the calls to
the ALLOCATE-OVERDEMAND subroutine, which means that pj = 1. From |Di| > 1, we have
p(Di) > 1 and i cannot afford its demand set.
Case 3). Agent i receives several items priced at . If Di contains any item that was allocated at a price
of 1, then clearly buyer i cannot afford Di. Otherwise, none of the items in Di was labeled as over-
demanded; then buyer i both affords and receives at least one copy of each item in its demand set,
which would contradict the choice of agent i as unhappy.
From the case analysis we conclude that each agent i gets an optimal bundle at the current prices, and
so (x,p) is a CAEI solution.
The algorithm has at most m rounds, each of which calls the ALLOCATE procedure depending on
whether there is over-demand or under-demand. In the first type of call, the procedure executes a constant
number of operations for each agent in the set of active agents that want the current item, which is clearly
bounded by c · |S|, where c is a constant and |S| ≤ n. In the second type of call, of under-demand, the
procedure allocates all the players in S one item each, and then gives the last player allocated in that call
all the remaining items; this takesO(n) operations. Thus the runtime can be bounded by poly(m,n, logQj).
It follows that in both cases, the algorithm runs in polynomial time, which completes the proof. 
We illustrate the execution of Algorithm 2 through an example.
Example 6 Let N = {1,2,3,4,5}, M = {1,2,3,4,5}, quantities Q1 = 2, Q2 = 4, Q3 = 2, Q4 = 3, Q5 = 2,
demands: D1 = {1}, D2 = {1,2}, D3 = {1,3}, D4 = {2,3,4}, D4 = {2,3,4,5}. Only agent 1 has singleton
demand {1} and |Q1| ≥ 1, so there is a CAEI.
Algorithm 2 sorts the agents in increasing order by demand set size and initializes S = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5). The
search for over-demanded items begins. Item 1 is wanted by 3 agents in S, namely {1, 2, 3}, butQ1 = 2 < 3;
it is over-demanded. Set p1 = 1, x1 = x2 = {1}. Update S ← S \ {1, 2} = {3, 4, 5}.
Next item 3 is over-demanded (wanted by agents 3, 4, 5 but Q3 = 2). Set p3 = 1 and x3 = x4 = {3}.
Update S = {5}.
All the items are in sufficient quantities now (i.e. there is no over-demand any more). Give all the re-
maining goods to agent 5 at price  = 1/14 each.
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It is NP-hard to compute a welfare-maximizing CAEI (see, e.g., [8]). However, if we no longer insist
that all the items are allocated, we can get a polynomial time algorithm by solving the problem as if the
goods were divisible, and then rounding the solution.
Theorem 9 Consider a fair division problem with agentsN ,m items in quantitiesQ = (Q1, . . . , Qm), and
demand Di ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} for agent i ∈ N . Let T be the types of the agents, where same type agents have
the same demand. Then a welfare maximizing CAEI, where all items need not be sold, can be computed in
polynomial time if |T | is a constant.
Proof: We can convert the problem into an instance with divisible goods, where there is one unit from
every good and the percentage required by player i from item j is Di,jQj . Consider the variant of Algorithm
1 where it is not necessary that all the items are sold—note this variant can be obtained with minor modifi-
cations, by changing the respective constraints from “=” to “≤”. By running such an algorithm, we obtain
an optimal allocation from equal incomes with divisible goods without item clearing and which is obtained
at some tuple (x,p). Then define a corresponding allocation x¯ in the instance with discrete goods, where
x¯i,j = bxi,j · Qjc. Then the tuple (x¯,p) satisfies the property that the allocation is feasible, each player
gets an optimal bundle at the current prices, and the social welfare is the same as in the corresponding
problem with divisible goods. Moreover, no allocation in the problem with discrete goods can obtain higher
social welfare than in the corresponding problem with divisible goods. It follows that we obtain a welfare
maximizing allocation from equal incomes via Algorithm 1, which runs in time poly(n,m). 
6 Relation to Other Fairness Solution Concepts
In this section we show that the CAEI solution is not equivalent to other standard concepts of fairness.
Clearly CAEI is not equivalent to proportionality in the realm of single minded valuations, since proportion-
ality exists very rarely on such instances. However, envy-free allocations often do exist in the domain that
we studied. We wish to show that the CAEI solution is strictly stronger than envy-freeness; that is, while
every CAEI allocation is envy-free, not every envy-free allocation can be supported through CAEI.
Thus CAEI can be seen as a method for ruling out the least desirable envy-free allocations, i.e. those
that cannot be “explained” through any equilibrium pricing scheme. It remains an interesting direction for
future work to more fully understand the CAEI solution.
Theorem 10 The CAEI solution is strictly stronger than envy-free freeness for single minded agents in all
the models considered: multiple divisible goods, cake cutting, and multiple discrete goods.
Proof: The proof is broken down in three components, corresponding to the scenarios considered. For
multiple divisible goods, let there be an instance with N = {1, 2}, M = {1, 2}, and demands D1 =
〈0.2, 0.2〉, D2 = 〈0.8, 0.8〉. Consider the allocation x1 = 〈1, 0〉, x2 = 〈0, 1〉. Clearly, this allocation is
envy-free since each agent is missing one good in either of the bundles x1, x2. Assume there exist supporting
CAEI prices p. By feasability constraints, we have: p1 ≤ 1, p2 ≤ 1 (I). From the optimality condition of
CAEI, we must have that no agent can afford a better bundle; in particular, agent 1 cannot afford their own
demand set: 0.2 · p1 + 0.2 · p2 > 1 (II). From (I) and (II), we have that 5 < p1 + p2 ≤ 2, contradiction.
In the cake cutting model, let N = {1, 2}, D1 = [0, 0.4], D2 = [0.4, 1], and consider the envy-free
allocation x1 = [0, 0.2] ∪ [0.4, 0.7], x2 = [0.2, 0.4] ∪ [0.7, 1]. Suppose there exists a CAEI price curve p
at x; denote by p1, p2, p3, p4 the prices of the intervals [0, 0.2], [0.2, 0.4], [0.4, 0.7], [0.7, 1], respectively. By
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feasability constraints, we get: p1 + p3 ≤ 1 and p2 + p4 ≤ 1 (III). Both agents have a utility of zero at x, so
none should afford their demand set, i.e. p1 + p2 > 1 and p3 + p4 > 1 (IV). From (III) and (IV) we get that
2 < p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 ≤ 2, contradiction. Thus p cannot exist.
Finally, for multiple discrete goods, let N = {1, 2}, M = {1, 2, 3, 4} with Qj = 1 ∀j, demands
D1 = {1, 2}, D2 = {3, 4}. Consider allocation x1 = {1, 3}, x2 = {2, 4}. Both agents have utilities zero at
either bundle x1,x2. The CAEI constraints give: p1+p3 ≤ 1, p2+p4 ≤ 1 (V) and p1+p2 > 1, p3+p4 > 1
(VI). It follows that 2 < p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 ≤ 2, contradiction.
In all the scenarios considered, the envy-free allocation x is not a CAEI solution. 
7 Discussion
We studied the computation and complexity of the competitive allocation from equal incomes, a method for
fair division, for single minded agents for multiple divisible and discrete goods, and cake-cutting. Although
a solution can be computed efficiently, social welfare maximizing solutions are hard to compute in general.
However, we solved the latter efficiently for several interesting special scenarios. Problems with constantly
many goods, or altogether characterizing easy instances remain unresolved. It will be interesting to settle
these. We note that our results also work valuation classes where the agents have a desired target set (e.g. the
set of parts of a bike), and very small positive value () for any other bundle of goods. For such scenarios,
the solution computed is an -CAEI.
An immediate generalization is that of Leontief valuations, where even existence of succinct characteri-
zation of instances that admit CEEI or CAEI in case of discrete goods is not clear, while the bigger question
of understanding fair division with complementarities remains a mystery at large.
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A Missing Proofs
Theorem 11 Given a fair division instance with single minded valuations and divisible goods, and alloca-
tion x, a CAEI solution at x can be found in polynomial time (if one exists). Similarly, given price vector p
a matching allocation can be found in polynomial time.
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Proof: Given p, let S be the set of agents that can afford their demand at these prices; that is, for each
i ∈ S, we have that∑mj=1 vi,j∗pj ≤ 1. Then an equilibrium allocation can be found by solving the following
constraints with variable x:
m∑
j=1
xi,j · pj ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N
n∑
i=1
xi,j = 1, ∀j ∈M
xi,j ≥ vi,j , ∀i ∈ S
xi,j ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N, ∀j ∈M
That is, we require that each agent can afford its own bundle, the agents in S get their demand set, all the
goods are allocated and the allocation is feasible.
For the second part of the theorem, suppose we are given an allocation x. Let S ⊆ N be the set of
agents that receive their demand under x, i.e. for which xi,j ≥ vi,j ∀j ∈ M . If x satisfies basic feasability
constraints (i.e. all the items are sold and x ≥ 0), Then a price vector that matches the allocation (if it exists)
can be found by solving the following linear program:
max 
subject to
m∑
j=1
pj · xi,j ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ S
m∑
j=1
pj · xi,j ≥ 1 + , ∀i ∈ S¯
pj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈M
 ≥ 0,
The constraints require that the agents in S can afford their bundles, while the agents in S¯ cannot. The
value of  obtained by solving the LP is strictly positive if and only if there is an equilibrium at x (and zero
otherwise). 
Theorem 12 Given a cake cutting problem with single minded valuations and allocation x, a supporting
price curve can be computed in polynomial time (if one exists). Similarly, given a price curve p, a CAEI
allocation at p can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof: Given a price curve p, let S be the set of agents that can afford their demand at p. Consider the
finest partition P = (I1, . . . , Im) induced by the demand sets of the agents and the allocation x, such that
every endpoint that appears in a demand set or in x is included as an end-point for some interval Ij . Then
divide each interval Ij into a number of pieces (of equal length) equal to the number of agents that want
this piece. Let P ′ = (J1, . . . , Jr) be the resulting, finer partition, with these additional points resulting from
cutting the intervals Ij . Now the problem can be interpreted as an instance with multiple divisible goods—
one for every interval J`—and valuations vi,` defined such that for any agent i and good J`, we have vi,` = 1
if J` ∈ Di and vi,` = 0, otherwise. By Theorem 11, a supporting set of prices can be computed in polynomial
time (if it exists), and these can be converted into a price curve in the cake cutting problem.
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Given a price curve p, we can compute again a partition induced by the demands of the agents, and solve
the problem of finding the allocation by calling the algorithm for divisible goods in Theorem 11 and casting
back the solution to an allocation in the cake cutting problem. 
Theorem 13 Given an instance with single minded utilities and discrete goods, and an allocation x, it can
be decided in polynomial time if there exist equilibrium prices to support the allocation x. However, it is
co-NP-hard to determine if there exists an allocation x such that (x,p) is an equilibrium.
Proof: Given an allocation x, it can be checked in polynomial time if the allocation is feasible. Afterwards,
we can simply write a linear program with real variables  and p1, . . . , pj to find the supporting prices (if
any). Note that  will correspond to the objective of the program and will have the property that for each
agent i that does not get its demand, p(xi) ≥ 1 + .
For the other direction, of finding the allocation given the prices, this problem was shown to be co-NP-
hard even when all the quantities are 1 (see, e.g., [8]). 
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